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Home/Threats/New Windows Malware Spreads Via WhatsApp, Grants Remote Access
Threats

New Windows Malware Spreads Via WhatsApp, Grants Remote Access

Key Takeaways A novel malware campaign is actively exploiting WhatsApp to deliver remote access capabilities to Windows systems. The attack propagates through malicious VBScript files disguised as...

Emy Elsamnoudy
Emy Elsamnoudy
June 22, 2026 5 Min Read
6 0

Key Takeaways

  • A novel malware campaign is actively exploiting WhatsApp to deliver remote access capabilities to Windows systems.
  • The attack propagates through malicious VBScript files disguised as financial documents, sent via compromised WhatsApp accounts.
  • Victims have been identified in over a dozen countries, with Malaysia experiencing approximately 80% of reported infections.
  • The malware installs legitimate remote management software, making detection more challenging for standard security tools.
  • Indicators suggest a Chinese-speaking threat actor is behind the campaign.

A sophisticated and ongoing malware campaign is leveraging WhatsApp to compromise Windows users across at least 12 countries, granting attackers unauthorized remote access to their systems. Cyber intelligence firm Resecurity recently published an in-depth report detailing the intricate mechanisms and global reach of this operation.

Table Of Content

  • Key Takeaways
  • Infection Chain Details
  • Signs Pointing to a Chinese-Speaking Operator
  • What You Should Do

The attack employs social engineering tactics, utilizing malicious script files that mimic common financial documents. These files trick unsuspecting users into executing harmful code on their machines, initiating a covert infection chain.

Upon execution, the disguised script silently triggers a sequence of actions culminating in the attackers establishing full remote control over the victim’s computer.

First detected in June 2026, this campaign remains active. Resecurity’s analysis identified victims in diverse regions, including Malaysia, Brazil, India, Mexico, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Spain, Taiwan, Australia, Russia, and Vietnam. Notably, Malaysia has borne the brunt of the attacks, accounting for an estimated 80% of all recorded infections, as highlighted in a comprehensive analysis by Securelist.

According to the Securelist report shared with Cyber Security News (CSN), the threat actors gained control of legitimate WhatsApp accounts. They then exploited these compromised accounts to discreetly send malicious attachments to all contacts within the respective address books.

This method significantly increases the likelihood of successful compromise, as recipients are far more prone to open attachments from trusted, known contacts without suspicion.

Infection Chain Details

The malicious attachments are VBScript files, a type of script natively executable by Windows via the built-in Windows Script Host. These files are cleverly named to appear innocuous, such as “Financial Reports.vbs,” “Debt Statement.vbs,” and “Account Statement.vbs.” The campaign’s global targeting is further evidenced by the availability of these malicious files in multiple languages, including Portuguese, French, German, and Malay.

A distinguishing characteristic of this attack is its final payload: the installation of legitimate remote management software rather than conventional malware like viruses or data stealers. This approach allows attackers to operate with the same level of access as an IT support team, making detection significantly more challenging for conventional security solutions.

The infection process commences when a user opens the VBScript attachment, whether through the WhatsApp Desktop application or WhatsApp Web in a browser. The script executes silently via Windows Script Host, immediately preparing the system for subsequent stages of compromise. It establishes a hidden folder within the Public Documents directory, using randomized names like “MSUpdate_random” to evade detection.

Subsequently, the initial script downloads two additional script files from servers controlled by the attackers. The first of these secondary scripts attempts to modify User Account Control (UAC) settings in Windows, typically responsible for alerting users before significant system changes. By disabling or lowering UAC prompts, the path is cleared for the second script to install software without user intervention or on-screen notifications.

The second downloaded script retrieves a ZIP archive containing a fully pre-configured installation package for a remote management agent. Once extracted and executed, this package silently installs itself using Windows Installer. Upon successful installation, the agent establishes a persistent connection to the attacker’s command-and-control servers, granting them covert and ongoing remote access to the victim’s machine.

Signs Pointing to a Chinese-Speaking Operator

Security researchers have identified several clues within the script files that suggest the involvement of a Chinese-speaking developer. Multiple variants of the VBScript contained comments and annotations written in simplified Chinese characters. These comments included references to Windows Update modules and system integrity checks, appearing consistently across various script versions.

Furthermore, an analysis of the attacker’s infrastructure revealed overlaps with previously documented malware families. One of the IP addresses used by the attacker-controlled servers had been associated with the ValleyRAT and Gh0st RAT malware in prior campaigns. While this correlation does not definitively confirm attribution, researchers assess with low confidence that the campaign is likely orchestrated by a Chinese-speaking operator.

What You Should Do

  • Exercise Extreme Caution with Attachments: Never open attachments received via WhatsApp, even from known contacts, unless you have independently verified the file’s legitimacy through another communication channel (e.g., a phone call or email).
  • Beware of Executable File Types: Be particularly suspicious of file types such as VBS, VBE, EXE, BAT, CMD, JS, and PS1. These should never be opened without explicit, independent confirmation.
  • Maintain User Account Control (UAC): Ensure your Windows User Account Control (UAC) settings are kept at their default or higher security levels. This provides crucial alerts before unauthorized system changes.
  • Keep Endpoint Protection Updated: Regularly update and run comprehensive endpoint detection and response (EDR) or antivirus software. Ensure real-time protection is enabled.
  • Educate Yourself and Others: Stay informed about common social engineering tactics and phishing attempts. Share this knowledge with colleagues, friends, and family who use WhatsApp.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):-

Type Indicator Description
IP Address 202.61.160[.]208 Attacker-controlled ManageEngine UEMS server
IP Address 202.61.160[.]202 Attacker-controlled ManageEngine UEMS server
IP Address 202.61.160[.]201 Attacker-controlled ManageEngine UEMS server (previously linked to ValleyRAT/Gh0st RAT)
IP Address 202.61.160[.]160 Attacker-controlled ManageEngine UEMS server
IP Address 202.61.160[.]137 Attacker-controlled ManageEngine UEMS server
IP Address 38.55.151[.]63 Attacker-controlled ManageEngine UEMS server
Domain temu.baskwms[.]top Malware distribution domain
Domain invoice.msopsa[.]top Malware distribution domain
Domain baoxis[.]cc Malware distribution domain
Domain sdcwww.oss-ap-southeast-1.aliyuncs[.]com Payload hosting (Alibaba Cloud)
Domain baoyuw2s.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws[.]com Payload hosting (AWS S3)
Domain sjdkjj23.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws[.]com Payload hosting (AWS S3)
Domain xijkwm2.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws[.]com Payload hosting (AWS S3)
Domain yifubafu.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws[.]com Payload hosting (AWS S3)
File Hash (MD5) c7f38cbb99c8b74fa0465293feeba700 Financial Reports.vbs
File Hash (MD5) b7cd06c71465038b658a6dc1f273a507 Debt confirmation.vbs
File Hash (MD5) 9f13c7b8ba391b2f597874e54d310648 Electronic statement(A).vbs
File Hash (MD5) 993f4c0cadbc769a4b0ed62a918db58d Financial Reports(s).vbs / FinancialReportsS.vbs
File Hash (MD5) 7f81c1bc8cfd588e8998968e2621456e Outstanding Payment List.vbs
File Hash (MD5) 7403cbcc5a9c32384d431856dc48fcc9 Statement of debt (4).vbs
File Hash (MD5) 68c16c46f8afb9e00bbaba0207fb0a46 Debt Note (2).vbs
File Hash (MD5) 66442f2457eca8f47385b1fb2c6fcab8 Statement of Debt(30K).vbs
File Hash (MD5) 6359e6236471cbe434d0ef4c42b7f879 Applicationform1.vbs
File Hash (MD5) 5b6bbcc06cf08cc99e1afeda486d42fb Extrato de Conciliação.vbs
File Hash (MD5) 5002eca748205d544618e3bd2dedc223 Statement of Debt(29K).vbs
File Hash (MD5) 4f0593e8e0e8fac49429e9b45ebf7fa1 Outstanding Payment List.vbs
File Hash (MD5) 4044e4b6471c9de7b0a4ba37d9d9df9a billing statement (2).vbs
File Hash (MD5) 20209b3a32769afc6a75694b8d8839dd Statement of Debt(A).vbs
File Hash (MD5) 0ba93109757776a44de9d8c88baa4963 Financial Reports(C1).vbs
File Hash (MD5) 02bb20455cc592a69c080abac770ce90 Le formulaire de demande le plus récent.vbs
File Hash (MD5) 6c39900d77dcba158e1d27c7619cb06d Outstanding Balance Sheet(A).vbs
File Hash (MD5) dad708e050632a4280cabf98ac1376b7 Outstanding Balance Sheet.vbs
File Hash (MD5) 05d188f071d097f5b6bd8138749b4b14 Penyata bank.vbs
File Hash (MD5) 2c6f05f1f309d89b2236e6c8b59c88f9 Account Statement (13K) (2).vbs
File Hash (MD5) 3b1aba44dd3d9b6339b6f56e2f42034b Statement of Account.txt
File Hash (MD5) d43fdaa1f0ee09d7e5f0f94ee9df7b6c Bitte füllen Sie das Formular…aus.vbs
File Hash (MD5) df4fa0369eaca5cec348be293890d4af Account Statement.vbs
File Hash (MD5) 63ac85195b73753333316a889cf5880f Statement of Account(O).vbs
File Hash (MD5) 74fd9f91fc93b6288b4fc253ea5b3e20 Sila semak bil anda.vbs
File Hash (MD5) d06333c360b51456f427e616c3c5f8bd Sila semak bil anda.vbs (variant)
File Hash (MD5) 1d94fbe9cab21278cc3f104bea334d08 Promissory_Note(b).vbs
File Hash (MD5) 9d9ac85765e4a818a3ccabe2cf4fef82 Debt Statement.vbs
File Hash (MD5) 6fb6a55424adfb61e31f06aef33273e5 dfjieya.vbs
File Hash (MD5) f90ed4b2d0b67114aa89ddfed658e5c0 dfjieya.vbs (variant)
File Hash (MD5) 8c3322009b8982663c0cbecd9492e7eb 0lf.vbs
File Hash (MD5) 66705384a7ad81d14c34fc6c054a0ecf iowepv.vbs
File Hash (MD5) 8c6d9fc389ad3f20ccbc71d77eb39bfa btksfmsi.vbs
File Hash (MD5) 1a3cc75466ffb1971482f7abf7aabc3f home3.vbs
File Hash (MD5) 1c47c63e5ed25060d95359c57c77b107 zipats.vbs
File Hash (MD5) 31037a42ca048e06e69a78f55bc2eff5 1122.vbs
File Hash (MD5) 7f16449cd0c4862d1eadf8a5742bf09a payload_1.vbs
File Hash (MD5) 79ecd61b09b0f2d54b34586c916c4ec9 sac8.vbs
File Hash (MD5) 7849061c536a3efb05a56d504694e7e7 6oy.vbs
File Hash (MD5) ddaffe9849f7f3c79f8804adb9a6b3d5 kof.vbs
File Hash (MD5) d01cad98dd0d01b75e04e784953c5e2b sleestak_payload_1.vbs

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

Disclaimer: HackersRadar reports on cybersecurity threats and incidents for informational and awareness purposes only. We do not engage in hacking activities, data exfiltration, or the hosting or distribution of stolen or leaked information. All content is based on publicly available sources.

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Emy Elsamnoudy

Emy Elsamnoudy

Emy is a cybersecurity analyst and reporter specializing in threat hunting, defense strategies, and industry trends. With expertise in proactive security measures, Emily covers the tools and techniques organizations use to detect and prevent cyber attacks. She is a regular speaker at security conferences and has contributed to industry reports on threat intelligence and security operations. Emily's reporting focuses on helping organizations improve their security posture through practical, actionable insights.

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